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SOURCE

A. Personnel Strength of the Ground Forces of the Soviet Group of Occupation Forces Germany (GOFG).

I. Basis for Estimating Strength

1. A strength estimate estimate has been established on the hitherto determined OB situation of the Soviet ground forces in Germany and was computed for the armies on the basis of the percentage relation between the actual strength and peace strength of several units. A strength estimate obtained by merely adding up the troop strengths as reported by regular sources from military posts and barracks installations would be inaccurate and subject to errors because the sources usually make their observations from outside the billeting areas and thus are likely to overestimate the number of troops particularly in times of relatively quiet routine training. Also, it is not practicable in all cases to have a second source verify the statements by the first within a period of from two to three months. The method of establishing a strength estimate, which is applied below, has the advantage that it is based on authentic figures regarding the actual strengths of units, confirmed peace strengths of numerous units and the current OB situation which is substantiated on the whole.
2. The determination of the present actual strength is founded on four original Soviet strength reports from the Soviet Zone of Austria, because no original documents on the strength of units upwards of platoon level have been received from the Soviet Zone of Germany during the past six months. The figures in these original strength reports have been compared with the peace strengths specified by a deserter of the 14th Guards Mechanized Division in 1949. These figures proved absolutely reliable when checked against the numerous original documents obtained during the last two years.

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On the basis of this information the following conclusions can be drawn:

- a. The Soviet Army units of the 13th Guards Mechanized Division are maintained on the basis of an authorized strength which corresponds to the peace strength of a mechanized division (i.e., 65 to 70 percent of the war strength) as specified by the deserter.
- b. The actual strength in the fall of 1951 was only slightly below the peace strength and apparently rose slightly above peace strength following the turnover of personnel in October and November 1951.

There is a possibility that these conclusions cannot be applied exactly to the units in the Soviet Zone of Germany which might have strengths slightly above those of the units in the Soviet Zone of Austria. There is also a possibility that the relationship between actual strength and authorized strength is closer with regard to tank units than infantry and mechanized units. There is no doubt, however, that the conclusions above constitute a basis for the hypothesis that the Soviet ground units in the Soviet Zone of Germany also have an actual strength equaling 105 percent of the prescribed peace strength. The strength computations below have been computed by using this percentage.

3. The peace strengths, on which the strength estimates for mechanized divisions are based, were taken from the statements by the deserter of the 14th Guards Mechanized Division, and for all other units they were either derived from the figures relative to the mechanized division or on the basis of other information. The assumed peace strengths of the artillery divisions are probably inaccurate because the organization of the component artillery brigades has not been determined.
4. Little authentic information is available with regard to the strength of the rear service installations of the armies and headquarters GOFG. The following estimates are based on reports pertaining to supply depots, repair shops and offices:

Eighth Guards Army and Third Shock Army:	2,100 men each
First and Second Guards Mechanized Armies:	1,100 men each
Third and Fourth Guards Mechanized Armies:	1,300 men each
GOFG	8,500 men

The ratio of rear echelon personnel to combat and support personnel in regard to specific armies follows:

Eighth Guards Army and Third Shock Army:	4.5/100
First, Second, Third and Fourth Mechanized Armies:	3 to 3.5/100
GOFG:	An additional 3/100

The ratio of rear services personnel to combat and support personnel therefore amounts to only 7/100 in contrast to about 18/100 as existed during World War II. This small ratio is explained by the fact that the Soviet Army uses, to a large extent, German manpower and installations such as the railroad system. In addition, the strength estimate below includes the motor transport units in support units whereas they were part of rear service units in World War II.

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II. Strength Estimate of the Individual Units.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Peace Strength</u>	<u>Present Actual Strength</u>
1. Eighth Gds Army		
Army Hq	450	450
Hq XXVIII and XXIX Gds Rifle Corps	400	400
39th Gds Mtz Rifle Div	8,500	8,900
57th Gds Mtz Rifle Div	8,500	8,900
20th Gds Mecz Div	9,400	9,900
21st Gds Mecz Div	9,400	9,900
13th AAA div	2,100	2,200
43d (Gds) Army Arty Brig	1,100	1,150
Two Corps AT Arty Brigades (1,050 each)	2,100	2,200
220th Hv Tank SP Regt	750	780
316th (?) and u/1 RL Regts (450 each)	900	960
446th, 27th Gds and u/1 Sig Bns (220 each)	660	700
19th Gds, 880th and u/1 Eng Bns (320 each)	960	1,100
Two u/1 AAA Regts of Corps HQ Troops (300 each)	600	630
257th Motor Trans Bn	<u>350</u>	<u>350</u>
Total Combat and Supporting Units	46,170	48,420
Rear Services of the Army	<u>2,100</u>	<u>2,100</u>
Total Strength of Eighth Gds Army	48,300 (appr)	50,500 (appr)
2. Third Shock Army		
Army Hq	450	450
Hq IX and LXXIX Rifle Corps	420	420
94th Gds Mtz Rifle Div	8,500	8,900
207th Mtz Rifle Div	8,500	8,900
19th Gds Mecz Div	9,400	9,900
18th Mecz Div	9,400	9,900

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Peace Strength</u>	<u>Present Actual Strength</u>
3d Gds AAA Div	2,100	2,200
44th (?) Army Arty Brig	1,100	1,150
3d Gds (?) and 4th Gds (?) AT Arty Brigades (1,050 each)	2,100	2,200
136th Gds Tank SP Regt	750	780
10th Gds and u/i RL Regts (450 each)	900	960
105th Sig Regt	580	600
977th and two u/i Sig Bns (220 each)	660	700
19th (?) Engr Regt	780	820
890th Engr Bn and one u/i Engr Bn	640	680
Two u/i AAA Regts of Corps HQ Troops	600	630
U/i Motor Trans Bn	<u>350</u>	<u>350</u>
Total Combat and Supporting Units	47,230	49,540
Rear Services of the Army	<u>2,100</u>	<u>2,100</u>
Total Strength Third Shock Army	49,300 (appr)	51,600 (appr)
3. First Gds Mecz Army		
Army HQ	400	400
9th Tank Div	8,200	8,600
11th Gds Tank Div	8,200	8,600
8th Gds Mecz Div	9,400	9,900
4th Gds AAA Div	2,100	2,200
U/i Light Arty Brig	1,050	1,100
1st Assault Engr Regt	780	820
6th Motorcycle Bn	350	370
One Sig Regt (not identified but believed to exist)	580	600
One RL Regt (not identified but believed to exist)	<u>450</u>	<u>480</u>
Total Comat And Supporting Units	31,510	33,070
Rear Services of the Army	<u>1,100</u>	<u>1,100</u>
Total Strength of 1st Gds Mecz Army	32,600 (appr)	34,200 (appr)

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Peace Strength</u>	<u>Present Actual Strength</u>
6. Fourth Gds Mecz Army		
Army Hq	400	400
10th Gds Tank Div	8,200	8,600
25th Tank Div	8,200	8,600
6th Gds Mecz Div	9,400	9,900
7th Gds Mecz Div	9,400	9,900
U/1 AAA Div	2,100	2,200
11th (?) Gds Light Arty Brig	1,050	1,100
312th Gds RL Regt	450	480
118th Sig Regt	580	600
3d Engr Regt	780	820
51st (?) Mtrcl Regt	<u>470</u>	<u>500</u>
Total Combat and Supporting units	41,030	43,100
Rear Services of the Army	<u>1,300</u>	<u>1,300</u>
Total Strength of Fourth Gds Mecz Army	42,300 (appr)	44,400 (appr)
7. General HQ Units of GOFQ		
Group HQ	600	600
Hq IV Arty Corps	200	200
6th Arty Div (4 Brigs)	7,500	7,900
34th (?) Arty Div (2 Brigs)	3,500	3,700
2d Gds AAA Div	2,100	2,200
6th (?) Gds AAA Div	2,100	2,200
32d (?) AAA Div	2,100	2,200
4th (?) AT Arty Brig	1,050	1,100
25th Gds RL Regt (or Brig)	450	480
66th (?) Sig Regt	580	600
U/1 Engr Regt	780	820
36th Pontoon Bridge Regt	780	820
56th Motor Trans Regt	800	850

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Unit	Peace Strength	Present Actual Strength
57th Motor Trans Regt	800	850
Total Combat and Supporting Units	23,340	24,520
Rear Services IV Arty Corps	800	800
Total Strength GHQ Units	24,100 (appr)	25,300 (appr)

8. Total Strength of the Soviet Army Personnel of the GOFG. On the basis of the above calculations, the grand total of the personnel strength of the Soviet Army forces in Germany (excluding the personnel of the SCC, Wismut Corporation and economic agencies) is:

Eighth Gds Army	50,500
Third Shock Army	51,600
First Gds Mecz Army	34,200
Second Gds Mecz Army	33,800
Third Gds Mecz Army	44,400
Fourth Gds Mecz Army	44,400
GHQ Units of the GOFG	25,300
Rear Services of the GOFG	8,500
Total Strength of Soviet Ground Forces in Germany	293,000 (appr)

B. Personnel Strength of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army.

I. Foundations for a Strength Estimate.

No positive information such as Soviet documents, reports by deserters, etc., is available on authorized and actual strengths of any single component of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army. A strength estimate of the total personnel of this air army is feasible, however, on the basis of various items of information, such as reports by local residents on the personnel strength at airfields, records from civilian laundries which work for air force units and records from bakeries supplying airfields and air units. The actual strengths have increased in some cases because of the modernization of aviation regarding air traffic safety control, the extension of the radar net, etc.

On the basis outlined above, the actual strengths of the headquarters and air units of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army are tentatively estimated as follows:

I. Air Army headquarters and army headquarters units:

	Total (officers and EM)
Army headquarters (including the signal regiment, construction staff, administrative staff, MYD section, motor transport and courier units)	1,500
Signal unit operating the radar sets in the army area	500
Stationary aircraft repair shop (SAM)	400
Aircraft repair shop train (PAM)	300
Stationary motor vehicle repair shop (SARM)	220

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Total (officers and EM)

2. Corps headquarters and corps headquarters units:	
Corps headquarters (including the signal company)	250
ATD (including signal-communications personnel)	200
Motor transport company	200
Construction battalion	450
GAS	150
Motor vehicle repair shop (Letushki)	50
3. Division headquarters (including signal company)	200
4. Tactical air units:	
Fighter regiment	240
Ground attack regiment	350
Bomber regiment	400
Air reconnaissance regiment	350
Air transport regiment	200
5. Ground units and airfield service personnel:	
OATB (per regiment)	250
Signal platoon (per regiment)	100
ATR (airfield service company) (per field)	100
Repair shop (per field)	10

II. Strength Estimate

1. On the basis of the number of units specified in paragraph I, the strength of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army is computed as follows:

Total (officers and EM)

Army headquarters (according to paragraph I/1)	2,920
Four corps headquarters (according to paragraph I/2)	5,200
Ten division headquarters (according to paragraph I/3)	2,000
Eighteen fighter regiments (18 times 240)	4,320
Six ground attack regiments (6 times 350)	2,100
Six bomber regiments (6 times 400)	2,400
Two air reconnaissance regiments (2 times 350)	700

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Total (officers and EM)

One air transport regiment	200
One air transport squadron	70
Thirty-four OATBs (34 times 250)	8,500
Thirty-four signal platoons (34 times 100)	3,400
Twenty-five ATRs (25 times 100)	2,500
Twenty-five aircraft repair shops (25 times 10)	<u>250</u>
Grand total	34,560

2. In addition to the units mentioned in paragraph II, there are some hitherto unidentified air force units in the area of the Twenty-Fourth Air Army. For example, there is an air unit with an OATB having a total strength of about 500 men in Koethen; a motor transport unit of about 600 men in Dresden-Klotzsche; a school for radar operators in Wittstock etc. On the other hand, about half of the fighter regiments are still short of personnel because of the recent activations. Hence it is believed that the number of air force personnel actually stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany does not deviate substantially from the total of about 34,500 officers and men.

C. Strength Estimate of the MGB and SCC Personnel in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

1. Despite the lack of positive data on the strength of MGB units and offices, it is possible to compute the strength of MGB personnel in the Soviet Zone of Germany on the basis of motor vehicle number analysis. Regarding the Soviet Army, the ratio between motor vehicle numbers and personnel strength is about 40,000 : 300,000, that is 1 : 7.5; and with regard to the Twenty-Fourth Air Army, about 4,000 : 34,000, that is 1 : 8.5. Regarding MGB units and, in particular, MGB offices, it is believed that the ratio between motor vehicles and personnel is substantially lower. Assuming that the ratio is 1: 6, the approximate figure of 1,000 motor vehicles assigned to the MGB indicates that the strength of MGB personnel is 6,000. MGB units with a strength of 4 regiments and 5 battalions have been identified in the Soviet Zone of Germany to date. With 700 men to a regiment and 300 men to a battalion, the MGB units total 4,300 men. The MGB headquarters and its signal unit have an estimated strength of 700 men, and all remaining MGB offices have an aggregate strength of about 1,000 men. Thus the strength of the MGB personnel in the Soviet Zone of Germany is believed to be 6,000.
2. There has been no usable information on which to base a strength estimate of the SCC personnel. Nor can a relationship between SCC vehicles and personnel be established because the four-digit vehicle number of the M xx-xx block have not been analyzed to date. The strength of the personnel belonging to the SCC and the economic agencies in the Soviet Zone of Germany is very roughly estimated at 11,000.

D. Total Strength of Soviet Forces in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The strength estimates itemized in Sections A through C and estimated strength of Soviet Naval personnel add up to the following grand total of Soviet military personnel in the Soviet Zone of Germany:

GOFG:	293,000
Twenty-Fourth Air Army:	34,000
MGB/MVD personnel	6,000
Personnel of SCC and Soviet economic agencies:	11,000
Soviet Naval personnel:	<u>2,000</u>
Grand total of Soviet military forces:	346,000

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